Dropzone's main promise is that we can't read your drops. Everything is encrypted in your browser, and the key only exists in the link's URL fragment (the part after #), which browsers never send to servers.
Payment links add a second requirement. The person holding the link shouldn't be able to decrypt the drop until they've paid. And we still shouldn't be able to decrypt it at any point. Here's how both work together.
The problem
Normally the link contains the whole key:
https://dropzone.sh/d/<id>#<key>
If that's how a paid link worked, the buyer could skip the payment page. They'd fetch the ciphertext and decrypt it with the key they already have. Hiding the download behind a payment check doesn't help when the client already holds everything it needs.
The obvious fix is to give the server the key and have it release the key after payment. But then the server holds the key and the ciphertext, which is exactly what we promise never to have.
The fix: split the key
When you create a payment link, your browser:
- Generates a random 256-bit AES key and encrypts the file with it (AES-256-GCM, the same as any other drop).
- Generates a second random 256-bit value. This fragment share goes in the link.
- Computes the server share as
key XOR fragment. - Uploads the ciphertext, plus the server share, price, and address, to Dropzone.
export function splitDropKey(key: string) {
const fragment = toBase64Url(randomBytes(32));
return { fragment, share: combineDropKey(key, fragment) };
}
export function combineDropKey(fragment: string, share: string) {
const mask = fromBase64Url(share);
return toBase64Url(fromBase64Url(fragment).map((byte, i) => byte ^ mask[i]));
}This is a 2-of-2 XOR secret split. Each share on its own is uniformly random and reveals nothing about the key. You need both to rebuild it:
- The buyer has the fragment share (it's in their link) but not the server share.
- Dropzone has the server share and the ciphertext, but never sees the fragment, because browsers don't send URL fragments to servers.
So the buyer can't decrypt without us, and we can't decrypt without the link.
Checking the payment
Dropzone doesn't run a Bitcoin node or hold funds. It asks the public mempool.space API how much the receiving address has received:
chain_stats.funded_txo_sumis the total received in confirmed transactions.mempool_stats.funded_txo_sumis the total received in unconfirmed ones.
The status is:
| Status | Condition |
|---|---|
paid | confirmed total ≥ price |
confirming | confirmed + unconfirmed total ≥ price |
waiting | anything less |
The payment page polls this every 20 seconds (and only while the tab is visible). Once the status is paid, the buyer clicks Open drop. The server re-checks the payment itself instead of trusting the browser, then returns the ciphertext with the server share in a response header. The browser XORs the share with its fragment and decrypts locally.
Because "paid" just means "this address has received enough", the address has to be fresh. When you create a link, Dropzone:
- rejects any address with confirmed or unconfirmed transactions, and
- records the address so the same one can't be used for a second link.
Otherwise an earlier payment, or a payment for another link, could unlock the drop.
Single use vs reusable
With Destruct on download on, opening the drop after payment uses it up. Once a download starts, the link is locked and later requests are refused, even if the first download was interrupted. With it off, the server share is released to anyone who has the link once the address has been paid. That's convenient for the buyer, but it means the link can be resold.
Either way, paid links expire after 30 days.
What this design does and doesn't promise
What it does:
- Dropzone can't read the file. We never hold both key shares.
- The person with the link can't decrypt it until the address has received the price with one confirmation.
- Funds go straight to the seller. We never touch them and take no fee.
What it doesn't:
- It doesn't verify who paid. Any payment to the address counts.
- It doesn't make the seller honest. We can't see the content, so we can't check it matches what was promised. Bitcoin payments can't be reversed.
- It doesn't hide the address from mempool.space. Our server queries it there to check the balance. The privacy policy covers this.
- It doesn't protect against a dishonest Dropzone. In theory, we could release the server share without a payment, or withhold it after one. What we can't do is decrypt your file, because that needs the link.
That last point is the property we care about most. The payment check is enforced by our server, but the confidentiality of your file never depends on trusting us.
Try it
Upload something at dropzone.sh, turn on Require payment, and paste a fresh address from your wallet. See How to Sell a File for Bitcoin With a Single Link for the step-by-step version.